Two instruments, two different jobs, and a set of choices that decide whether either one is trusted. Detector types, what to write into a specification, how calibration and the daily source check work, and the survey technique that actually finds contamination.
Walk into most Bangladeshi nuclear medicine departments and you will find one radiation instrument, usually in a drawer, usually with a flat battery, usually last calibrated at some point nobody can name. It gets carried out when an inspection is expected. That is the practical position, and it exists because the two instruments a department needs do different jobs and neither one is any use until somebody trusts it.
The regulatory expectation itself is set out in radiation safety and regulatory compliance. What follows is the engineering underneath it: what to buy, how to keep it honest, and how to use it so that it finds something.
A dose rate meter answers the question how much radiation is there here, and reports in microsieverts or millisieverts per hour. It is what you use to survey a room boundary, to check a delivery package, to decide whether a corridor is safe to stand in and to measure a patient before release.
A contamination monitor answers a different question: is there loose radioactive material on this surface. It reports counts per second, and it is sensitive rather than accurate. Its job is to find a spot of activity on a bench, a glove, a shoe or a floor tile that a dose rate meter would never notice.
Departments try to make one instrument do both, and it does neither well. A sensitive contamination probe saturates in the field beside a therapy patient. A dose rate meter sized for that field will not see a small technetium spill at all. Buy both, and buy the contamination monitor first if the budget only stretches to one, because in unsealed source work loose contamination is the failure that actually happens.
The detector determines the instrument's character far more than the badge on the case does.
The one specification detail that catches out even careful buyers is the dose rate range. If the department will ever handle a therapy activity or receive a generator, the instrument has to read up into the millisievert per hour range at the surface of a pot. A meter that tops out below that is not merely inconvenient, it is misleading, because some tube types fold back towards zero when they saturate. Approaching a source with an instrument that has jammed low is how people get doses they never find out about.
Instrument tenders in Bangladesh tend to be written around a model name, which either produces one bid or produces a substitute nobody evaluated. Specify the performance instead.
Calibration is annual, traceable, and specific to energy. An instrument calibrated against a caesium 137 beam is not thereby correct at 140 keV unless the certificate says what its response is there. Ask for the correction factors, and keep them with the instrument rather than in a file, because they are useless if the person holding the meter does not know they exist.
The practical problem in Bangladesh is turnaround. An instrument sent away for calibration is gone for weeks, and a department with one meter is a department that is uncalibrated or unmonitored for that period. There are two workable answers: hold two instruments and stagger their calibration dates, or write a loan instrument into the service agreement at purchase. Deciding this after the first calibration is due is how departments end up running for a year on an expired certificate.
Between calibrations, the daily check is what tells you the instrument still works. It takes under a minute: battery indication, background reading in a known clean place, then the response to the check source in a fixed geometry. Write all three in the log. The purpose is not the individual numbers, it is that a response which has fallen by a third since March tells you the tube is dying before the day you need it.
Most contamination surveys fail for the same reasons, and all of them are technique rather than equipment.
Wipe counting needs a counter, not a survey meter. A well type counter is the proper instrument. Departments without one sometimes count wipes in the dose calibrator well, which is crude, geometry dependent and only defensible if the same method is used consistently and the limitation is written into the procedure.
The last point is about where the survey happens. Departments survey the hot lab bench thoroughly and forget the route the dose travels: the injection room, the arm of the chair, the trolley handle, the corridor floor between the two, and the toilet used by patients after injection. Contamination is found where people have walked, not where the source was kept. The waste side of the same problem is covered in radioactive waste in a nuclear medicine department, and what to do in the first hour after a spill is set out in the first hour after a spill in the hot lab.